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Between  the  1880s  and  the  1930s,  three  “regulatory  cycles”  can  be  identified  in  Italy.  In  the 
underlying model, each financial crisis gives rise to a regulatory change, which is circumvented in 
due time by financial innovation, that can then contribute to the outbreak of a new financial crisis. 
In Italy, overtrading of the banks of issue in the 1880s contributed to the 1888-1894 financial crisis, 
which yielded regulation concerning only these banks and restricting their activity. The German-
type universal banks, created at the turn of the century and unconstrained in their undertakings, 
were at the core of the 1907 and the 1921-1923 crises. These led to a banking law in 1926 which, 
however, was born obsolete, in that it was not aimed at regulating universal banking as it had 
developed until then, but it contained general provisions regarding the whole range of deposit-
taking  institutions.  Finally,  the  evolutionary  adaptation  of  the  universal  banks  into  holding 
companies, not taken into account by the preceding law, contributed to the 1931-1934 banking 
crisis, followed by the 1936 bank legislation. 
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In his forthcoming book about the origins of market institutions in Victorian England, Paul 
Johnson writes: “Each set of 19
th century market regulations produced new constraints but also an 
array of opportunities for businessmen and financiers to develop innovative ways. With unerring 
inevitability, innovation prompted regulation, and new ways of doing business promoted further 
rounds of boom and bust” (Johnson 2009, forthcoming). 
 
Johnson’s  observation  lends  itself  to  a  fairly  universal  application,  at  least  as  financial 
markets and  regulation are concerned. In its wake, each financial crisis gives rise to a regulatory 
change in order to supplant the obsolete legislation and to prevent the occurrence of similar events 
in the future. In due time, financial innovation which sidesteps the restrictions and requirements 
imposed by the institutional setting emerges to exploit new profit opportunities and/or adapt to a 
new business environment, fuelling in turn a further financial crisis. We find that this “regulatory 
cycle”, possibly with one exception, fits Italy’s experience in the 1880s-1930s period.
1 
 
Between the Peninsula’s political unification in 1861 and the Great Depression of the early 
1930s, Italy’s financial system proved to be highly unsettled, punctuated as it was by numerous 
episodes  of  financial  instability  of  varying  severity.  Most  crises  provided  the  intellectual  and 
political impetus for a new regulatory wave, which was then followed by unregulated financial 
innovation. Only the post-1945 adaptation of the Banking Law of 1936 seemed to produce (or 
accompany) a long period of financial stability, which persisted on the whole until 2008. 
 
As Italy’s financial market was, until recently and possibly even nowadays, largely bank-
oriented, financial crises mainly coincided with banking crises, which are thus the subject of our 
narrative. The term “financial innovation” is therefore taken in a broad, and perhaps loose, sense to 
include new processes or business practices that banks employed to carry out their intermediation 
activity, untrammelled and unheeded. 
 
Three types of financial innovations are identified in the period under study. Overtrading 
of the banks of issue in the 1880s contributed to the 1888-1894 financial crisis, which yielded 
regulation concerning only these banks and restricting their activity. The German-type universal 
banks, created at the turn of the century and unconstrained in their undertakings, were at the core of 
                                                 
1 The idea of a regulatory cycle can be traced back to Kane (1986), who adopts the expression “regulatory dialectic”, 
and to Miller (1986), who aptly recognizes taxes and regulation as impulses to innovation.   3 
the 1907 and the 1921-1923 crises. These led to a banking law in 1926 which, however, was born 
obsolete, in that it was not aimed at regulating universal banking as it had developed until then, but 
it contained general provisions regarding the whole range of deposit-taking institutions. Finally, the 
evolutionary adaptation of the universal banks into holding companies, not taken into account by 
the  preceding  law,  contributed  to  the  1931-1934  banking  crisis,  followed  by  the  1936  bank 
legislation. 
 
The paper is structured in the following way. A brief overview of the main financial crises 
in Italy since unification is followed by four sections devoted to as many episodes of financial 
instability and to the subsequent regulatory legislation. A final section sums up the main findings 
and briefly accounts for  post-war financial regulation. A first appendix lists the main banking 
reforms in Italy from the XIX
th century onwards. A second appendix describes in detail the contents 
of the three main crisis-prevention regulatory laws. A third and last appendix concerns the crisis-
management institutions created in Italy in the period under study. 
 
 
2.  Italy’s financial instability  
 
For  the  scope  of  the  paper,  it  must  be  noted  that  Italy’s  financial  sector  was  (i) 
underdeveloped  at  least  until  1914,  (ii)  bank-oriented,  (iii)  highly  unstable  until  1931,  stable 
thereafter.  
 
Underdevelopment  can  be  roughly  measured  by  Goldsmith’s  Financial  Intermediation 
Ratio  (FIR),  which  was  0.2  in  1861,  0.3  in  1881  and  0.4  in  1914, below  that  of  countries  of 
comparable per caput GDP levels. Thereafter, Italy’s FIR reached the level roughly to be expected 
in relation to its per caput GDP: 0.6 in 1930 and 0.4 in 1951. The FIR attained its peak in 1973 
(170%). It was approximately 150% at the beginning of the century (Goldsmith and Zecchini 1999, 
Carriero, Ciocca and Marcucci 2002).  
 
At the time of the Restoration, the Italian financial system was made up of a handful of 
traditional public credit institutions
2, of a few joint-stock banks (società anonime),
3 and private 
bankers. No stock exchange worth mentioning existed at the time. In the following decades, other 
                                                 
2 Banco delle due Sicilie, Banco di Santo Spirito, Monte dei Paschi, la Compagnia di San Paolo. 
3 They were mainly discount banks, in Florence, Livorno and Rome.   4 
institutions  came  to  life:  mutual  savings  banks  (casse  di  risparmio)
4  from  1822,  other  public 
limited-liability banking companies from 1856, cooperative banks (banche popolari) from 1865, 
and small rural banks (casse rurali) from 1883. The Cassa Depositi and Prestiti (similar to the 
French Caisse des Depots et Consignations), founded in 1863 to fund public works and invest in 
Treasury bonds, soon (1875) became the main depository of postal savings. Pivotal to the system 
were the numerous banks of issue, which operated as commercial banks.
5 Onado (2002) describes 
the Italian financial system at the time of unification as underdeveloped, based mainly on its banks 
of  issue  and  on  a  few  financial  circuits  directed  towards  specific  sectors  of  the  economy. 
Subsequent development was slow and, as we shall see, punctuated by banking crises. 
 
Besides being underdeveloped, Italy’s financial system was bank-oriented. Almost all the 
XIX
th century was characterized by the existence of numerous local stock exchanges, most of which 
were  all  but  irrelevant.  Financial  market  unification,  measured  by  price  convergence,  was  not 
achieved until the 1880s (Toniolo, Conte and Vecchi 2002). The price-maker for Italy’s government 
bonds  was  the  Bourse  de  Paris.  After  1900,  the  Milan  Stock  Exchange  gradually  grew  to 
concentrate most of the country’s bond and equity deals; it remained however relatively small, thin 
and expensive, while banks retained a considerable market power. Between 1900 and 1906, both 
the number of listed companies and equity transactions increased in a most promising way. The 
crisis of 1907 dealt a blow to Italy’s equity market from which it did not fully recover until at least 
the 1980s. It was, therefore, the banking system that provided the majority of financial services.  
 
Until the early 1890s, the system was dominated by six banks of issue and by a couple of 
large commercial banks, one of which, created by the Perèire brothers, had survived the fall of the 
French parent company. From the 1890s onwards, the system was led by a handful of German-type 
universal banks while the Bank of Italy (resulting from the merger of three banks of issue and the 
takeover of a fourth) gradually assumed the standard functions of a central bank. In the interwar 
years, a number of State-owned or State-promoted long-term credit institutions flanked commercial 
banks by providing long-term credit via a large use of State-guaranteed bond issuance. One of the 
reasons for this development can be ascribed to the gradual transformation of the large banks which 
by  the  mid-1920s  looked  more  like  holding  companies  than  traditional  universal  banks,  each 
providing credit first and foremost to the joint-stock companies in which they had invested. 
                                                 
4 The casse di risparmio were initially charity institutions, created to collect the lower classes’ savings, but, over time, 
they turned into proper credit institutions. 
5 Banca Nazionale, Banca Nazionale Toscana, Banca Toscana di Credito and Banco di Roma (added in 1870) were 
already banks of issue and inherited as such by the new State, whilst Banco di Napoli and Banco di Sicilia became 
banks of issue in the modern sense only in 1866, after Italy’s unification.   5 
 
Finally, Italy’s financial system proved to be unstable until 1931-36 (the period of time 
covered by the paper), while it showed a remarkable stability in the following years, possibly up 
until the current crisis.  
 
Given  the  above-mentioned  features  of  the  system,  Italy’s  financial  crises  were  all 
essentially banking crises. Most of them were preceded or accompanied by stock market crashes 
and one of them by a currency crisis, while Italy never experienced episodes of sovereign default on 
external or domestic debt.  
 
  The paper deals with four financial crises, those of the early 1890s, of 1907, of 1921-23, and 
of 1931-1934. We do not deal with the first post-unification crisis of 1873, when Italy shared  in the 
first significant international crisis (Kindleberger 1989: 146).
6 This was, in fact, mainly a stock 
market  crisis,  which  did  not  affect  the  six  Italian  banks  of  issue  (accounting  for  over  half  of 




The  four  financial  crises,  here  reviewed  for  their  impact  on  subsequent  financial 
regulation, occurred alongside corresponding international crises, but at the same time presented 
marked idiosyncratic features. The co-movement of the financial and real economy variables was 
negligible in 1907, but was quite considerable in the other three cases, all marked by falling output 
and  employment.  The  crises  of  the  early  1890s  and  early  1920s  interacted  with  and  possibly 
reinforced a situation of deep social distress with serious political repercussions. Most crises were 
either triggered or  accompanied by stock market crashes and the crisis of 1888-94 was a typical 
“twin” bank and currency crisis.
8 
 
After the Second World War, the Italian economy enjoyed a long period of lower real 
economy volatility and of financial stability. Some bank failures did occur, however posing no 
systemic  threat.  In  the  1970s  price,  income  and  employment  volatility  increased  and  financial 
stability was threatened by the little known and under-researched solvency crisis of a few long-term 
                                                 
6 The crisis began in Vienna, it then spread to other European (Dutch, Italian, Belgium) and to the US stock markets. 
7  The crisis involved savings banks and cooperative banks (together accounting for about 20 per cent of the credit 
market)l, but it was private bankers and joint-stock companies (which accounted for 25% of the market) that suffered 
the most.  The crisis resulted in a downsizing of the banking sector , with a capital loss equivalent to about 2-4% of 
1873 GDP (Carriero, Ciocca and Marcucci 2002). 
8 The nominal exchange rate of the lira with respect to the US dollar dropped from 103.5 in 1889 to 94.8 in 1894, whilst 
the real exchange rate dropped from 104.8 to 95.4, implying a devaluation of nearly 10% (Ciocca and Ulizzi 1990).   6 
credit institutions (Istituti di credito speciale) which were bailed out and eventually restructured by 





This section is devoted to the first regulatory cycle, focusing on the nature and ratio of the 
banking act of 1893. The act of 1893 – which gave origin to the Bank of Italy – is the most 
important and consequence-ridden piece of the first phase of regulation.  
 
The Italian story parallels in many respects that of Great Britain some fifty years earlier. 
Initially, regulation of the banks of issue was due to their nature of joint stock banks rather than to 
their note issuing activity.
9 When, in 1866, the convertibility of the lira was suspended
10, the Italian 
financial debate partially shadowed the British one, with bullionists set against anti-bullionists and 
with the adherents to the currency school against those of the banking school. In Italy, however, the 
setting was complicated by the fact that the fragility of new-born State did not allow the central 
Government to defy the powerful regional groups, each supporting the persistence and expansion of 
the  banks  of  issue  which  had  been  active  in  the  former  States.  The  controversy  concerning 
discretion vs. rules in banking, which had been crucial in the British debate, was partially effaced 
by the more sensitive political issue concerning plurality vs. unification of note issue. The focus of 
this dispute was not on the merits of free-banking, but rather on those of monopoly vs. oligopoly of 
note  issue (Cardarelli 2006). A rather extensive body of regulation regarding the banks of issue 
(which had reached the number of six) was put in place, but it was not uniform across banks and it 
was difficult to enforce, due both to its cumbersome nature and to the political backing which any 
violation could muster. 
 
In 1881 a law was passed to reintroduce the gold standard by 1883. A widespread belief 
among the disciples of the currency school was that monetary stability and financial stability were 
intimately tied under the gold standard regime.
11 Convertibility to gold constituted a constraint on 
credit expansion and therefore a deterrent to financial imprudence. Some contemporary journals
12 
                                                 
9 We refer here mainly to the case of Banca di Genova, founded in Genoa (Kingdom of Sardinia) in 1844. 
10 Due to the preparation of the war with Austria-Hungary, with the subsequent difficulties in the international financial 
markets. 
11 See Issing (2003), Borio (2004) and Borio and Toniolo (2006), among other publications on the subject. 
12 See for example the “Giornale degli Economisti”, directed by De Viti De Marco, Mazzola, Pantaleoni and Zorli, in 
which Pareto had a monthly column.   7 
argued that the convertibility of banknotes into gold was the pivot of an orderly functioning of the 
money and credit market. Once convertibility was guaranteed, no other form of regulation was 
deemed necessary. Banking school supporters, on the other hand, argued that financial crises could 
develop even under a regime of convertibility (Messedaglia 1876), but never got far enough as to 
propose regulation on non-issuing banks. 
 
The resumption of convertibility in 1883 was backed by a gold-denominated international 
loan which increased bank reserves and allowed for credit expansion. Overheating of the economy, 
largely brought about by investment in building construction, resulted in a de facto suspension of 
convertibility in 1887. In that year, the real estate bubble began to deflate and a number of banks 
which had  extended generous credit to the building sector ran into serious difficulties. Some of 
them (Banca Tiberina and Banco di Sconto e Sete) failed, after an ill-conceived and unsuccessful 
bail-out attempt by the largest bank of issue, Banca Nazionale nel Regno d’Italia.  
 
Meanwhile,  the  public  debate  concerning  the  banks  of  issue  became  intense.  It  was 
inflamed by the awareness that the banks of issue had not remained aloof from the real estate 
bubble.  The  quality  of  their  assets  was  uncertain,  especially  since  some  of  these  banks,  either 
because of business relations or in response to government pressures, had largely financed the 
construction firms or the banks involved in the bubble, even after real estate prices had started to 
decline. The concern about the soundness of the banks of issue turned into scandal at the end of 
1892, when two MPs of the low Chamber read excerpts of a report, written by State examiners, 
concerning the Banca Romana, one of the six banks of issue. The document, which had been kept 
secret by the government, revealed not only huge bank losses, but also the illegal measures Banca 
Romana had undertaken to remain afloat. The scandal prompted a new examination of all six banks 
of issue and speeded up the legislative process towards a new law. 
 
In  barely  six  months  the  law  was  passed  and  it  was  enacted  on  10
th  August  1893. 
Basically, the regulatory response consisted in the following. The number of the banks of issue was 
halved from six to three. Currency circulation was tightly regulated by imposing a limit to its 
outstanding amount, a 40% reserve requirement and norms on capital adequacy.
13 Convertibility 
was  reaffirmed  in  principle,  but  the  decree  which  should  have  set  the  legal  framework  for  its 
application was never brought about. The three banks of issue were placed under tight Government 
control: the discount rate could not be changed without the assent of the Government and was to be 
                                                 
13 See Appendix 2 for the details.   8 
the same for all three banks. Furthermore, the operations they were allowed to undertake were 
stated one-by-one in the law (rather than in the individual bank charters); the chief officials had to 
be approved by the government; and finally, the control apparatus was reinforced and obtained the 
necessary political backing. Even note-printing was tightly controlled, to the point that the printing 
of each banknote could not be completed without the application of a stamp by a State official. 
 
Needless  to  say,  the  1893  law  was  harshly  criticized  by  free  market  economists, 
particularly by those writing for the “Giornale degli Economisti”, who condemned the suspension 
of  the  public’s  right  to  conversion  of  banknotes.  Pareto  also  belittled  the  effectiveness  of 
government supervision, which was considered inevitably inferior to market discipline (or “public 
supervision” as he puts it), that is by the public exercising its right to conversion.
14  
 
In the wake of the crisis fuelled by overlending, two issues had come to the forefront. A 
macro issue – an excess of money circulation – and a micro one with systemic implications – the 
soundness of the individual banks of issue. The reduced number of banks was probably intended to 
be a response to both matters: the emergence of a clear leader (Bank of Italy) was seen as a decisive 
step  towards  the  unification  of  note  issue  and  the  control  of  money  supply.  The  macro  issue, 
including  the  stability  of  exchange  rate,  was  addressed  by  imposing  limits  to  circulation  and 
metallic reserve requirements, but not by re-introducing convertibility since this move was feared to 
be too costly (e.g. in deflationary terms) for the economy as a whole. The remaining regulation was 
designed to tackle the micro issue. Once asset quality had been taken care of (in principle) by 
limitations on the kind of permissible assets, one had to worry about imperfect application of the 
law: hence, the capital ratio. Guaranteeing the stability of the individual banks of issue was also a 
motivation for prescribing a liquidity ratio, although its main justification was in the macro domain 
(Negri 1989: 207). Next came the Government’s veto right on the nomination of top managers and 
the prohibition of  MPs to serve in the banks’ governing bodies. These provisions were a clear 
response  to  pro-bank  lobbying,  which  had  been  pervasive  in  the  preceding  years.  Finally,  the 
strengthening  of  supervision.  The  scandal  of  Banca  Romana  had  severely  shocked  the  public 
opinion, and a clear message had to be sent out : abundance of controls, severity of penalties. 
 
A crucial point of the story is that the banks of issue had gained a bad reputation: their 
managers were perceived to be at odds with the public interest and were not trusted by the political 
leaders who were trying to raise Italy out of its financial mess. Shortly after the enactment of the 
                                                 
14 In particular, see his columns in “Giornale degli Economisti”, April 1893, p. 313-319 and May 1983, p. 398-404.   9 
law (February-March 1894), a decisive battle against the private interests operating within the Bank 
of Italy was engaged by the Finance Minister Sydney Sonnino on a relatively unimportant issue. As 
a result, the director general Grillo and the president of the board of directors Parodi had to leave. 
This also stressed the new will of the Government to end old practices of elusion and evasion of the 
law (Bonelli and Cerrito 2003). 
 
But while the financial crisis was waning and the system was beginning to function under 
the newly-introduced rules, the international financial turmoil set in motion three years earlier by 
the Baring crisis struck Italy with a massive flight of foreign capital (October 1893 to March 1894). 
Consequently, the two main commercial banks failed, victims to runs, and tens of local banks 
followed suit. Losses were of the same magnitude of those of the preceding decade and have been 
estimated to be approximately 2.5% of GDP (Carriero, Ciocca and Marcucci 2003: 504). Either the 
banking law did not change market expectations about the country risk or it arrived too late (it came 
into force only on 1
st January 1894) to shelter the country from domestic and international shocks. 
This sudden and deep after-shock in the crisis did not elicit new  significant regulatory action. Some 
adjustments were made to the banking law of 1893, which, we recall, regulated only the banks of 
issue, but no lesson was drawn from the insolvency of the two largest commercial banks. Pantaleoni 
(1895) noted that the general public was hostile towards those who had made runs on the banks, by 
withdrawing their deposits. These agents were named ribassisti (short sellers) and enemies of the 
people, while the Government and the police, who deprived the depositors of their right to be 
reimbursed,  were  seen  as  saviours.  As  for  the  idea  of  bank  legislation,  the  famous  economist 
confined himself to reporting a witty note taken from Sumner: “There ought to be no laws to 
guarantee property against the folly of its possessors” (Pantaleoni 1895: 160). 
 
A Government Committee was set up to study reforms of the existing corporate law. Its 
recommendations included the proposal of setting aside three tenths of the capital of joint stock 
banks as a guarantee for deposits (Vivante 1895). These were not, however, translated into law. 
Inaction was possibly due to the fact that political energies had been exhausted (new priorities 
emerged immediately after the crisis) and to the lack of an economic or legal theory sound enough 
to provide a rationale for regulation beyond the realm of note issuance: as we have seen, it was 
widely believed that currency and financial stability were the two sides of the same token. Hence, 
the only rule specifically aimed at banks in the Italian legislation remained the Article 177 of the 
Code of Commerce, which required banks to transmit their balance sheets every month to the Trade   10 
Court (Tribunale di commercio). Their actual publication, owing to organisational difficulties, was 
lagged, however, by over one year. 
 
Once the tsunami passed, a period of rapid GDP growth in a stable monetary, financial and 
exchange  rate  environment  got  under  way.  Abundant  remittances  by  Italian  workers  abroad, 
contributed to the creation of large gold reserves which, as we shall see, would make the difference 
in the 1907 crisis. While convertibility was never formally declared, by 1902 the exchange rate had 
reached its par and the interest rate applied to the government debt steadily declined. Also, the stock 





The  main  financial  innovation  of  the  pre-war  period  of  sustained  growth  was  the 
expansion and evolution of the so-called universal bank. For the first time since Italy’s unification, 
banks – in particular the three largest ones created during and after the crisis of 1894 -  came to play 
a leading role in corporate finance. They forged close ties with their client companies, both large 
and medium-size. “Fiduciaries” of the banks, as they were then called, routinely sat on the boards of 
the  companies  or  were  appointed  as  consultants.  Banks  advised  and  assisted  IPOs,  frequently 
underwriting large amounts of shares to be gradually placed thereafter on the market. As a result of 
this  innovative  practice  by  unregulated  intermediaries,  banks  acquired  relevant  market-maker 
positions in the three main stock exchanges (Milan, Turin and Genoa), whilst often holding in their 
portfolios consistent amounts of shares either from IPOs or as collateral for loans. The main banks 
were therefore partly responsible for the rapid increase of equity prices, which suited them well by 
swelling the value of their assets; this, in turn, made it easier for the banks to float new capital on 
the market. Increased capitalization attracted new depositors, thus contributing to a rapid expansion 
of bank lending and equity underwriting. 
 
Particularly impressive was the growth of Società Bancaria Italiana (SBI, established in 
1898),  the  junior  member  of  the  large  universal  bank  league  (the  other  two  being  Banca 
Commerciale Italiana, est. 1894, and Credito Italiano, est. 1895).
15 The new issues were mostly 
made in connection to M&A operations by which the bank acquired a number of smaller credit 
institutions  and  expanded  its  operations  to  become  the  “third  credit  pillar”  of  the  rapidly 
                                                 
15 The initial 1898 SBI’s capital of 4 million lire was progressively increased to reach 50 millions 8 years later (Bonelli 
1971: 30-31).   11 
industrializing North Western  regions  (Bonelli 1971: 32).  Similarly to the  two  larger  universal 
banks, SBI engaged in extensive industrial lending, promoted IPOs and new capital issues, advised 
and financed restructuring operations. Having started operations on a large scale only in 1900, when 
its competitors had already conquered the largest, most solid and profitable industrial clients, and 
being less firmly established as a universal bank  than its rivals, SBI had to base its business on 
riskier clients that had often been discarded both by the other big banks and by the larger savings 
banks. Huge if perilous business came to the bank also through the acquisition of the previously 
mentioned Banca di Sconto e Sete under liquidation (Bonelli 1971: 34). Moreover, by 1907 SBI 
was controlled by a group of Genoese business people which “included some of less scrupulous 
representatives of the stock exchange speculation” (Bonelli 1971: 32). 
 
In 1906, aggregate demand – both for consumer and investment goods – was buoyant. 
Wages and profits increased, as did the already excessive demand for credit. In the second half of 
the year, interest rates progressively rose; international markets signalled the onset of the liquidity 
crunch that would characterize the following year. Italian banks sharply reduced credit to stock 
market traders. In October a liquidity injection by the Bank of Italy avoided the transmission of 
difficulties in Genoa to the other Stock Exchanges. To a farsighted observer, these developments 
should have highlighted the fragility of a system characterized by overstretched credit institutions, 
an over-indebted industrial sector and bank-dominated, oligopolistic, rather thin and illiquid equity 
markets. But very few people, in Italy or abroad, understood the dangers of increasing tension in the 
international liquidity markets. 
 
News  coming  from  the  United  States  advised  banks  to  further  limit  credit  to  stock 
exchange operations, thus accelerating the fall in equity prices. Yet, the Bank of Italy saw no reason 
for  concern  about  the  stability  of  the  main  banks.  Banca  Commerciale  and  Credito  Italiano 
discontinued their attempts at containing the decline in equity prices, whilst SBI alone persevered in 
attempting to raise the price of its own shares and that of its main debtors. The insolvency of one of 
its important client companies (Ramifera) highlighted the vulnerability of  SBI and of the whole 
banking sector. The Bank of Italy stepped in to finance a consortium of bankers and stock market 
brokers aimed at avoiding the liquidation of Ramifera with its likely implications for SBI. This 
move by the Bank of Italy signalled the possibility of further lending of last resort interventions, 
and revived earlier proposals for amendments of the existing regulation of the banks of issue in 
order to allow for additional liquidity creation  (i.e. expansion of circulation).  
   12 
  In September the stock  market nose-dived again. Bank of Italy branch  managers 
reported widespread evidence of a credit crunch. Hence, a considerable amount of liquidity was 
fuelled into the system out of concern for both the real economy and the position of smaller banks 
deriving from the drying-up of inter-bank credit (Bonelli 1971: 88). Pressed for liquidity, corporate 
clients of the large banks drew on their deposits, as did members of the general public. It became 
clear that SBI, the weaker ring of the chain, was in urgent need of a greater liquidity injection. The 
Bank of Italy persuaded SBI’s two main competitors to join a consortium which lent 50 million lire 
to the ailing bank, warning of contagion should the public lose confidence in the third largest bank 
in the country.
16  It is perhaps interesting to note that in order to close the deal, SBI had to accept 
the  creation  of  a  supervisory  committee  and  subject  itself  to  inspection.  This  financial  relief 
measure kept SBI going for a few weeks but it did not restore confidence. The Bank of Italy again 
persuaded  the  two  main  SBI’s  competitors  to  participate  in  a  lending  consortium.  This  time, 
however, financial assistance was made conditional on SBI being put under control of the lenders, 
who would then dispose of its assets. The unintended consequence for the Bank of Italy of its first 
large-scale lending of last resort operation was that it became involved in the management of a 
commercial  bank.  The  Bank  of  Italy  decreed  that  SBI  was  to  survive.  Thus,  capital  was 
reconstituted with fresh subscribers and Stringher, the head of the Bank of Italy, put one of his 
closest aids at the helm of SBI. By late Spring 1908, the crisis was overcome. 
 
What “lessons”, if any, were learned from the crisis of 1907? The main ones were about 
crisis management rather than prevention through adequate regulation. Both the Government and 
the Bank of Italy brought home the “domino effect” argument of avoiding big bank failures. To 
prepare for the management of future similar crises, the Bank of Italy came to believe that more 
ammunition had to be added to its arsenal, in particular more flexibility was required of its liquidity 
management. In 1907, the Bank could act without endangering macroeconomic equilbria as it was 
sitting  on  a  much  larger  metal  reserve  than  required  by  law,  but  circumstances  could  not  be 
expected  to be  as  favourable  all  the  time  in  the  future.  This  led  to  the  loosening of  limits  on 
circulation with a sequence of laws in 1907, 1912 and 1914.
17  
 
                                                 
16 Polsi (2001) emphasizes the fact that, for the first time and in a virtually unique case of the history of Italian finance, 
the Bank of Italy managed to bail out an important bank without requiring an upfront disbursement of taxpayers’ 
money.  
17 These laws were the corner-stone of a policy of deregulation of the banks of issue, started soon after le 1893 law, 
which included: a) Interest rates: the possibility of applying a rate lower than the official one to prime customers was 
introduced in 1895; b) Permissible operations: a larger part of reserves could be kept in foreign bills; the holding of 
consols was allowed in 1928; longer time was conceded to sell non permitted assets; d) Capital requirements: they were 
dropped altogether; e) Taxation: a shift took place, from a note circulation tax regime (which left the burden of non 
performing loans entirely on the bank) to a profit tax regime.   13 
The 1907 crisis also highlighted for the first time the pro-cyclical nature of the universal 
bank, the financial innovation of the time. Furthermore, it enshrined the Bank of Italy as the agent 
responsible for the stability of the banking sector. Moral hazard also came to the forefront. In 1907 
the largest banks had been reluctant to cooperate with the Bank of Italy and only too glad to pass on 
to the latter the task of bolstering credit to the economy (in particular to the large manufacturing 
companies).  Moral  hazard  issues  would  characterize  the  following  decades  with  requests  and 
political pressures for last resort lending, not only to banks but also to large industrial companies in 
distress. 
 
It would take another crisis for the “lessons” of 1907 to be translated into regulatory 
action. Nevertheless, the general idea that the credit sector should be made more responsible in 
order to better ‘safeguard depositors’
18 began to take hold. In 1908 a member of the Cabinet – 
Cocco  Ortu  –  initiated  legislation  aimed  at  protecting  small  depositors  of  commercial  and 
cooperative banks,  which was  however  torpedoed by the prime  minister (Bonelli 1991: 39)
19. 
Stringher, general manager of the Bank of Italy, indicated that rather than legislation what was 
needed was self-regulation of the banking sector.
20 In 1913, Nitti,  Minister of Agriculture, Industry 
and  Commerce,  again proposed  legislation  for  the  regulation  and  supervision  of  deposit-taking 
institutions. Provisions for the introduction of liquidity and reserve ratios and supervision were 
envisaged. If nothing came of these proposals, they nevertheless indicate a shift in the paradigm of 






If, as we have seen, a first proposal for bank regulation stemmed from the events of 1907, 
Italy’s first organic piece of regulatory and supervisory legislation
21 originated from the banking 
crisis of 1921-23. 
 
Wartime  expansion  of  industrial  output  by  heavy  industries  such  as  steelmaking, 
shipbuilding, automotive, arms and ammunitions was financed by credit lines generously opened by 
                                                 
18 This expression became the catch-word of bank regulators for forty years until it was actually introduced in the 1948 
Constitution of the Republic as “savings’ safeguard”. 
19 Banks were required to create two autonomous, fire-walled, sections for the separate management of ‘fiduciary’ (or 
‘saving’) deposits and ‘commercial’ deposits; the former - enjoying privileges in case of liquidation – could not be used 
for long term lending (Bonelli 1991, Doc 34 : 279).   
20 Bank of Italy Report of 30
th March 1912 (cited in Bonelli, 1991: 39-40). 
21 Royal Decree 7 September 1926 n. 1511 and Royal Decree 6 November 1926 n. 1830.   14 
the largest universal banks. One such bank, the Banca Italiana di Sconto, was actually created 
shortly before the outbreak of the hostilities by a group of industrialists who had large stakes in the 
Ansaldo  heavy  industry  conglomerate  (see  e.g.  Falchero  1990).  It  acquired  the  previously 
mentioned SBI. 
 
As  long  as  the  war  lasted,  a  discount  window  of  the  central  bank  ensured  that  bank 
liquidity never became an issue. To prepare for worst-scenario situations, the Bank of Italy acquired 
a panoply of new instruments to guarantee the stability of the system. When Italy was still neutral, 
in  the  Autumn  of  1914,  a  general  moratorium  (or  rather  strict  regulation)  on  bank-deposit 
withdrawal pre-emptied runs on the weakest banks and the spread of contagion (Toniolo 1989: 18-
25). The Bank also sponsored the creation (December 1914) of a special institution (the CSVI, 
Consorzio per Sovvenzioni su Valori Industriali) authorized to discount paper not eligible for direct 
discount at the banks of issue.
22 The original motivation for CSVI was to avoid the dumping of 
industrial equity on the market by banks or industrial companies in need of liquidity (Guarino and 
Toniolo  1993:  197-98).  As  we  have  mentioned,  since  at  least  1907,  the  Bank  of  Italy  had 
understood  its  duty  in  guaranteeing  the  stability  of  the  financial  system;  the  war  provided  an 
excellent acid test for its effectiveness in the job. But action was taken on an ad hoc basis and with 
ad hoc instruments either already at the Bank’s disposal (foremost among these, the exercise of 
moral  suasion)  or  through  legislation  initiated  by  the  Bank  itself.  The  post-war  banking  crisis 
showed that case-by-case (and often ex post) action did not secure financial stability and entailed 
costly lending of last resort operations, thus paving the way for a crisis-prevention rationale for 
regulation.  
 
After  a  brief  post-war  boom,  all  European  countries  bar  Germany  experienced  quite 
severe,  if  relatively,  short  depressions.  They  were  accompanied  by  financial  turmoil  and  bank 
failures in Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia (Feinstein H., Temin P., Toniolo 
G.,  2008:  42-45),  countries  in  which  corporate  finance  largely  depended  on  bank  lending. 
Hyperinflation spared Germany (the inventor of bank-centred industrial finance) from a banking 
crisis (Holtfrerich 1986). In Italy the banking crisis coincided with the crucial months of social and 
political instability that led Mussolini to power. It was also marked by a fierce struggle among 
capitalist  groups  for  the  control  of  the  largest  banks  and  industrial  conglomerates.  Both 
circumstances made emergency lending by the Bank of Italy not only subject to huge pressures, but 
also liable to accusations of partisanship from all directions.  
                                                 
22 See Appendix 3 for more details.   15 
 
At the heart of the banking crisis was the interlocking shareholding between the Ansaldo 
conglomerate  and  the  Banca  Italiana  di  Sconto  (from  now  on  Sconto).  As  a  slow  post-war 
restructuring process threatened Ansaldo’s solvency, Sconto commissioned as many as ten ships to 
the sister company. In little over a year’s time, the bank, which could not discontinue lending to 
Ansaldo, became virtually illiquid. As in 1907, the Bank of Italy turned to the two largest banks in 
order to create a consortium to supply liquidity to Sconto. This time, however, the two banks (in 
particular  Banca  Commerciale  who  had  been  the  target  of  a  hostile  takeover  by  the  main 
shareholders  of    Sconto)  were  even  more  sluggish  to  act  than  they  had  been  in  1907.  The 
consortium did not materialize until the end of 1921, too late to stem the withdrawal of foreign 
deposits from Sconto as well as from other banks in a classic scenario of bank contagion. The 
Government briefly toyed with the idea of a moratorium, but soon liquidation emerged as the only 
solution. A partial guarantee of deposits was given by the Bank of Italy through a new entity, a 
“Special  Section”  of  the  afore-mentioned  CSVI.  Ansaldo  was  de  facto  taken  over  by  the 
Government, thus becoming the first State-owned large conglomerate in the history of the Italian 
Kingdom. Almost at the same time (end of 1921 – spring 1922) another large bank, Banco di Roma, 
suffered huge deposit losses and became virtually illiquid. It was however provided with enough 
liquidity from the Special Section, with the guarantee of the newly-formed Mussolini Government, 
to outlive the crisis, even if as a crisis-prone lame-duck. 
   
How did this episode shape the regulatory attitude of the authorities? The crisis brought 
home the lesson that regulation concerning banks of issue was not sufficient to attain the stability of 
the whole banking system. Time had come to regulate commercial banks. A first draft of a new 
Banking Act was prepared in the fall of 1923 (Guarino and Toniolo 1993: 403-15).  It took three 
more years for the law to overcome intense bank lobbying and to land in Parliament, where it was 
passed in the Autumn 1926 (shortly after another law had granted the bank of Italy monopoly of 
note issue). Free bankers and the lobbying association of limited liability companies strongly argued 
against the desirability of “protecting depositors by law” and the creation of a supervisory authority 
with  inspection  powers.  A  brief  act  was  passed  in  September,  to  which  a  more  articulate  one 
followed in November.  
 
The new regulatory regime applied to all banks. A key provision of the act was that an 
authorization was required for the creation of a new bank or branch, as well as for mergers and 
acquisitions. This created a power to control over-banking, which was considered one of the main   16 
problems of the time. On the other hand, the ability to get a hold on the actual management of the 
banks rested on two other provisions: the first was minimum capital and reserve requirements; the 
second was a limit to credit to any individual client, which could not exceed one fifth of the bank’s 
equity. The regulating entity was entrusted with supervisory powers, via information disclosure and 
on-site inspections. One major problem of this legislation was that different categories of banks 
were subject to different supervisory authorities. 
 
The bank legislation of 1926 was largely obsolete before even being enacted. It regulated 
banks as they existed before the war. In fact, its drafters made explicit reference to the 1908 and 
1911 proposals. But the war had already changed the banking industry as observed, in 1920, by the 
Minister of Industry and Commerce who – speaking before the Parliament – had to say: “Our credit 
institutions have changed their nature from deposit-based commercial bank into investment banks”.  
He argued that the very nature of the credit system was thus changed for two reasons: on the one 
hand  the  balance  sheet  of  the  banks  was  linked  to  the  ups  and  downs  of  equity prices  of  the 
industrial  companies  they  invested  in  and,  on  the  other  hand,  “banks  aim  at  taking  control  of 
industrial companies and the latter of being the masters of the banks” (Santoro 1927: 44-45).  
 
 
6.  1931-1938 
 
By 1931, when State intervention quelled the liquidity crisis of the two largest Italian 
banks and shaped the financial and industrial set-up that would then prevail for the following four 
decades, the main universal banks
23 had undergone a transformation into quasi-holding companies. 
During and immediately after the war, the bank-industry link, hitherto limited to long term lending 
and investment bank operations such as IPOs, M&A and advising, had become much tighter due to 
the acquisition by banks of permanent stakes in manufacturing and utility firms. At the same time 
industrialists sought, with varying degrees of success, to gain control of the banks. 
 
During  the  brief,  if  buoyant,  cyclical  expansion  of  1922-25,  a  stock  market  boom,  
partially fuelled by the banks themselves, allowed the latter to easily extend credit to industrial 
companies on the security of the firms’ equity. When the stock market weakened in 1925, the banks 
stepped in in order to stem the falling value of equities. Unable to reverse the bear market on their 
own, the main banks resorted to the Bank of Italy which provided them with a billion lire facility 
                                                 
23 Banca commerciale italiana, Credito Italiano and Banco di Roma.   17 
for equity purchases on the market. Since this attempt too failed and most equity prices remained 
lower than they had been in 1925 for the rest of the decade, the banks had no alternative but to hold 
on to their equity portfolios. These portfolios were actually swollen in the following years as the 
intertwined fortunes of banks and industrial companies made it impossible for the former to refuse 
credit to the latter, again taking equity as collateral (Toniolo 1978).  By the end of the decade, as it 
will dramatically appear in 1931, Banca Commerciale and Credito Italiano actually controlled over 
50% of the equity listed on the Milan stock exchange  
 
Overall, the 1920s were characterized by endemic bank instability. The group of the so 
called “catholic banks”, undercapitalized and poorly managed, was partially bailed out by the state 
on the eve of the Concordat between Church and State.
24 Another significant, yet isolated, episode 
of bank hardship was that of the Banca Agricola Italiana, linked by mutual equity holdings to the 
industrial conglomerate Snia-Viscosa, producer of rayon, which was strongly affected by the drop 
in  exports  due  to  the  revaluation  of  the  lira  in  1927,  which  preceded  the  declaration  of 
convertibility. The Bank of Italy financed an orderly wind-down of the bank. 
 
Like other countries, Italy too was strongly affected by the Great Depression. Industrial 
output contracted by 25.1% between 1929 and 1932.
25 The real slump had an immediate impact on 
the banking sector. Confronted with deflation and falling demand, industrial firms could hardly rely 
on financing out of retained profits, while at the same time they saw the real value of their debts 
increase. They could thus only turn to banks for further loans to attempt to defend the integrity of 
their previous loans and the value of their equity assets. The withdrawal of foreign deposits made 
this strategy ever more dependent on credit from the Bank of Italy. As a last resort, the two largest 
banks made an attempt at self-regulation by trying to solve the maturity mismatch between their 
short term liabilities (deposits) and their long-term assets (stakes and credits to the industry) through 
the creation of ad hoc holding companies to which they shed their industrial stakes.
26 This was a 




                                                 
24 Guarino and Toniolo (1993). 
25 See Toniolo (1980) on the matter. 
26 Therefore, Banca commerciale increased its already existing financial firm Cisalpina’s capital and changed its name 
to Sofindit, whilst Credito italiano created Banca nazionale di credito. 
27 The attempt failed in that the universal banks had control over their financial firms and could not interrupt credit 
flows to the industrial sector. The financial firms were, in fact, a clear example of captive finance with respect to the 
banks that created them (Battilossi, 2000: 332).   18 
When all the above-mentioned measures failed to solve the liquidity problem of the banks, 
these had no alternative but to turn to the Government which, on 31
st December 1930, issued a 
secret decree mandating the Istituto di Liquidazioni (the heir of the Special Section: see Appendix 
3) to offer loans and advances to a whole list of financial institutions, including Credito Italiano. 
This then led to a secret deal (Convenzione) of 20
th February 1931 between the Bank of Italy, the 
Ministry  of  Finances  and  Credito  Italiano.  The  latter  accepted  a  restriction  of  its  activities  to 
“ordinary” (i.e. short term) commercial bank operations in exchange for a large liquidity injection. 
Credito Italiano’s industrial stakes were  passed on to a financial firm (Sfi) at balance sheet value. 
This deal is particularly relevant as it represents the first significant step towards the subsequent 
regulatory legislation, based on the separation between commercial and industrial banking. In fact, 
Credito italiano was banned from underwriting shares in industrial or real estate firms and was 
forbidden speculative trading in securities and real estate.  
 
Next, it was the reluctant Banca Commerciale’s turn to unveil its financial difficulties. In 
July 1931, it turned for help to the Bank of Italy, after the withdrawal of deposits, mainly by 
Americans, preoccupied by the rampant banking crises in Central Europe. In October 1931, another 
deal (Convenzione) between Banca Commerciale and the Government provided for the acquisition 
of the totality of the bank’s industrial stakes by the financial firm Sofindit, which obtained an ad 
hoc loan from the Istituto di Liquidazioni (i.e. ultimately from the central bank). From then on, 
Banca commerciale too was allowed only commercial banking activities.  
 
This  huge,  secret  and  complex  bail-out  operation  spared  Italy  the  consequences  of  a 
banking  crisis  similar  to  the  Austrian  and  German  ones  (Toniolo  1995).  The  rescue  and 
transformation of the main Italian banks was completed in 1933-34. In 1933, the holding companies 
were permanently separated from the parent banks; their assets were taken over by the newly-
created Istituto di Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), which also absorbed the Istituto di Liquidazioni. 
Originally  designed  as  a  temporary  solution  to  Italy’s  industrial  problems,  it  was  supposed  to 
restructure  and  recapitalise  the  main  companies  that  came  under  its  wing  before  being  newly 
privatized. When privatization proved to be difficult, IRI became a permanent State holding of 
utility and manufacturing firms in1937. To finance its activities, IRI issued bonds, guaranteed by 
the State. 
 
In 1930-1931, the banks had been saved by turning their short term debt into de facto long 
term exposure toward the Bank of Italy. The matter was finally settled in March 1934 by three deals   19 
(Convenzioni) between the State and each of the main universal banks
28. The idea was to free the 
three  banks  both  from  their  excessive  debt  burden  towards  the  Bank  of  Italy  and  from  their 
excessive credit exposure towards firms. All the industrial assets of the banks were transferred to 
IRI, which also took over the control of the banks. The banks, on their side, were banned from 
acquiring stakes in industrial or commercial firms, directly or indirectly, and from financing firms 
that later purchased majority stakes in the banks themselves. A clear-cut separation between bank 
and industry, in both directions,  was thus definitively attained in 1934. 
 
The Convenzioni of 1934 were a significant milestone in the new re-regulation wave, in 
that they not only re-organized the banking and financial sector as it had emerged from the crisis, 
but also contained regulatory prescriptions which inspired the 1936 banking legislation and which 
were,  under  this  new  guise,  extended  to  all  deposit-taking  institutions,  in  an  explicit  intent  to 
prevent further crises. The banking crisis of 1931-1933 brought home to legislators the inadequacy 
of  the  1926  law  in  guaranteeing  financial  stability,  for  two  reasons:  a)  it  turned  out  to  be 
incomplete, not biting and incapable of handling new entities, such as the universal banks turned 
into holding companies; b) it was not sufficiently enforced, especially due to lax supervision of the 
major financial institutions, thus resulting in a partially ineffective regulation.
29 On the contrary, the 
crisis management and crisis resolution measures implemented in the 1930s were effective, due to 
two main features: a) the secrecy with which the rescues were conducted and the pressure set on 
depositors not to withdraw their savings, which fended off runs; b) a learning-by-doing process, 
which proved that something had been learned from the previous banking crisis of the 1920s, if not 
in crisis prevention terms, at least in crisis management and resolution ones.  
 
“Permanent” and “intelligent” were the two adjectives used by IRI to describe the needed 
regulation.
30 The rules and sanctions prescribed were to be more detailed than those of 1926: the 
idea was that of more regulation, not only of better regulation. So whilst the 1926 legislation was 
made up of only 19 articles
31, the definitive 1936 law included 105 articles.
32 If we consider the 
                                                 
28 Banco di Roma, which had already been re-financed in 1922, had been less affected by the crisis than the other two in 
the 1930s. However, already in 1930 it had been asking the Bank of Italy for help in its reorganization to catch up with 
the “big two”. See the memorandum of Banco di Roma for the government and for the Bank of Italy of 19
th December 
1930 on the matter. 
29 Inspections, in fact, mainly targeted small local banks. The reluctance to interfere with the big banks was palpable. 
Between 1926 and 1932, 2,532 on-site examinations were conducted: 4 in national banks, 72 in interregional ones, 94 in 
regional banks, 270 in provincial ones and 2,092 in local ones. No inspection took place in the “Big Three”. Another 
example of ineffectiveness of the 1926 law is represented by the number of excess fidi granted. 
30 IRI statement to the Government on 5
th December, 1933. 
31 We here refer to the regolamento of 6
th November 1926.   20 
contribution of the numerous Convenzioni, then the regulatory reform took seven years (from 1931 
to 1938) to be devised and refined.  
 
The  first  novelty  of  the  1936  law  was  the  huge  discretionary  power  attributed  to  the 
regulating entity, which could dictate instructions and decide on many regulatory issues case-by-
case. The flexibility of the law thus coincided with great power, on the regulator’s behalf. Another 
factor was its composition of two parts: one concerning prudential regulation and supervision (crisis 
prevention), the other concerning crisis management, not at all treated in the 1926 law.  
 
The 1936 law incorporated the idea of one sole regulatory and supervisory authority, thus 
overcoming  the  1926  division  of  regulatory  powers.  It  hence  created  a  supervisory  authority 
(Ispettorato per la difesa del risparmio e per l’esercizio del credito), subordinated to a Committee 
of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister. Governmental authorities were thus empowered to regulate 
and to marshall the credit flows in the economy. “The State is not willing to pay for other bank 
rescues and the control of deposits cannot be left to anonymous shareholders, but must go to the 
State, which represents the people”.
33 The 1930s regulation had a clear allocative aim, as well as a 
stability purpose: by controlling credit, the Government could direct investment flows. Head of the 
Inspectorate was, however, the Governor of the Bank of Italy and, de facto, the Inspectorate never 
operated separately from the bank of issue, which therefore built up its supervision experience and 
know-how. Separation was formally reversed in 1947 when supervisory responsibilities were again 
assigned directly to the Bank of Italy.
34  
 
The law also marked the final transition of the Bank of Italy from a  bank of issue to a 
modern central bank, with three functions: control of money supply, last resort lending and bank 
supervision.
35 Its commercial banking activity was discontinued. 
 
The  new  perimeter  of  regulation  included  two  broad  categories  of  institutions, 
distinguished according to the maturity of their liabilities (short-term  vs medium/long-term).  A 
different, and less stringent regulation, was designed for the second category of institutions, thus 
                                                                                                                                                                  
32 What is commonly defined as the banking law of 1936 is however actually made up of the law 7
th March 1938, with 
amendments made by the successive 7
th April 1938 law. These two laws were the result of the conversion of two 
legislative decrees respectively of 1936 and of 1937. 
33 Free translation from the IRI statement of  27th March 1935. 
34 In 1944 the  Inspectorate was abolished and its  faculties and powers were transferred to the Treasury. Banking 
supervision was, however, delegated ex lege to the Bank of Italy, even though the Treasury could organize its own 
inspections when deeming them necessary. In 1947, the ex-Inspectorate’s functions were transferred directly to the 
Bank of Italy. 
35 Statement of the Confederazione Fascista dei Lavoratori delle Aziende del credito e dell’assicurazione, 1935.   21 
creating  a  segmented banking  system,  in  which  financial entities were  clearly defined by  their 
functions.  
 
The tight inter-relations between banks and industry were pinpointed as the main cause of 
the 1930s banking crisis,  as the “root of all evil”
36. The 1936 legislation confirmed the separation 
between the two sectors, if in a rather subtle manner, allowing some flexibility. It stated that the 
purchase by commercial banks of certain types of assets required the Inspectorate’s authorization. 
The norms on assets were introduced to avoid excessive risk-taking and risk-concentration, but also 
to ensure the mentioned separation. In the following years, the Inspectorate denied authorization to 
almost any investment in the industrial sector by any regulated entity. Universal banks, whose 
extreme evolution had led to the financial innovation at the core of the 1930s crisis, were thus 
banned from the Italian financial system, as was the relapse into maturity mismatching. On this 
point, whilst distinguishing financial institutions according to the maturity of their liabilities, the 
1936 legislation did not, however, explicitly regulate deposit and credit maturity. Except for the 
three  ex  universal  banks  (bound  by  the  Convenzioni),  in  theory,  other  short-term  liability 
institutions could lend long term. However, in order to avoid maturity mismatches between assets 
and  liabilities,  which  had  played  a  major  role  in  the  1930s  bank  crisis,  de  facto  the  temporal 
specialization was imposed by the Inspectorate’s instructions, which, in general, blocked long-term 
investments by institutions with short term funding. Finally, director interlocking between banks 
and firms was also forbidden.
37 
 
Oddly, the issue of bank ownership was not explicitly treated in the 1936 legislation. One 
reason  was  that  by  that  time  most  banks  were  under  public  control,  making  the  issue  almost 
irrelevant. In fact, the share of private banks in the credit market dropped from 55.6% of total 
credits in 1927 to only 16.96% in 1936 (Ferri and Garofalo 1994: 138). In order to avoid the 
purchase of bank shares by non-financial firms, moral suasion was used by the regulating entity. 
 
The limitation of competition is another predominant feature of the new regulation. Free 
competition was, in fact, considered as the major source of banking instability. This belief, already 
present in 1926, was taken to rather extreme levels in 1936. The Bank of Italy itself believed that 
                                                 
36 Statement of IRI’s board of directors dated 31st December 1936. 
37 The analogy with the US Glass-Steagall Act immediately comes to  mind. However, the two acts had different 
rationales and focused on partially different matters. In the US, commercial banks were accused of having contributed 
to the stock market crash via questionable securities dealings and were thus banned from underwriting and dealing in 
securities for their own account while, on the other hand, investment banks were denied the possibility of collecting 
deposits of any kind.  In Italy, the (under-developed) financial market was not an issue: given the nature of the crisis, 
the main priorities were a complete separation between bank and industry and maturity alignment.   22 
cut-throat  competition  between  banks,  defined  as  “bank  rivalry”  (rivalità  bancaria),  had  been 
responsible for high interest rates on bank deposits, in a struggle to attract depositors in a low-
liquidity market.
38 The regulators were concerned that price competition in the market for deposits  
would induce banks to take eccessive risk in their investments or to engage in activities outside of 
their core banking business (with negative effects on the stability of the banking sector)
39. In 1933 a 
blanket bank cartel (Cartello Bancario) was created by the Government fixing mandatory  interest 
rates  on  deposits.  The  1936  legislation  not  only  imposed  price  caps,  killing  interest  rate 
competition, but denied banks other competitive tools such as free branching.  Compulsory mergers 
and liquidations were part of further “structural regulation”, aimed at defining and modelling the 
banking sector, leading to the emergence of “an administrated oligarchy” (Costi 2007: 59) of banks. 
The emphasis set on other regulatory instruments, such as on capital adequacy, was thus decidedly 
inferior to the one attributed to the anti-competition measures. 
 
 Finally, information disclosure, on-site examinations and enforcement were made more 
effective. As well as disclosure to the authorities, some form of disclosure to the public was also 
required. In all forms of communication and publicity, in fact, the intermediaries had to list the 
capital and reserves held, according to the latest balance sheet. The Bank of Italy, on its behalf, was 
still attempting to educate the public to become more “responsible”: “Notwithstanding regulation, 
depositors  must  check  the  solidity  of  the  banks  they  entrust  their  savings  with.”
40  However, 
transparency in the 1936 legislation was basically intended as transparency towards the supervisory 
authorities,  rather  than  towards  the  market.  In  commenting  the  1934  Convenzioni,  the  IRI 
management stated: “(…) another myth had fallen: the myth of bank secrecy, that secrecy that had 
cost the State millions and millions and which had allowed the bank directors to prevent the State 
from looking into banking issues”,
41 confirming that transparency was intended toward the State. A 





                                                 
38 Bank of Italy  note of 1932. 
39 See also IRI note of February 1937 on the “Proposal to allow ordinary credit institutions to extend medium-term 
credit”, which states that the increase in bank profits, consequent to limits on branching and price regulation, limits the 
need for risk-taking and thus contributes to the stability of the system. 
40 Free translation from Bank of Italy Annual Report, 1931. This statement recalls a previous one made by the Governor 
Stringher to the general assembly of the Bank of Italy on 31st May 1928, in which he states that depositors must only 
turn to trustworthy institutions with a prudent and cautious management.  
41 Free translation from IRI statement of 27
th March 1935.   23 
7. Conclusions 
 
To sum up: loosely regulated banks of issue engaged in overtrading and risky loans to the 
construction  industry  were  perceived  to  be  responsible  of  the  early  1890s  crisis.  They  were 
therefore merged, downsized in their commercial business and tightly regulated by the Banking 
Law  of  1893,  with  the  belief  that  financial  stability  would  follow  sound  circulation  and 
macroeconomic equilibrium. While the latter was remarkably attained in the years up to 1914, 
financial instability re-emerged in 1907, since part of the credit market previously covered by the 
banks  of  issue  was  now  conquered  by  pro-cyclical  intermediaries  such  as  the  German-type 
universal banks. However, it took another crisis in the wake of the war for a new banking law to 
regulate commercial banks in 1926. This new regulatory wave did not per se induce the birth of 
new financial instruments; by then, in fact, the war and the stock market boom and bust of 1922-25 
had  largely  transformed  the  universal  banks  into  holding  companies  with  extensive  permanent 
stakes  in  the  manufacturing  and  utility  industry.  It  was  this  new  type  of  banks  which became 
illiquid in 1929-30 threatening the stability of both the financial system and the real economy. The 
ensuing regulatory wave originated from the need to prevent the recurrence of episodes of bank 
illiquidity which spread to the real economy due to the close interlock between banks and industry. 
It then went beyond bank-industry relations in regulating the system and providing regulators with 
wide, largely discretional, powers.  
 
The regulation that emerged in the wake of the crisis of the early 1930s was long-lasting. 
It contributed to nearly half a century of financial stability and held steady until 1993. Stability, 
however, was bought at a price. In guaranteeing financial stability, the bank law of 1936 sacrificed 
competition, thus leading to inefficiency, compounded by the extensive public ownership of the 
banks, with negative spillovers on consumers. The straight-jacket imposed on the banking system 
probably contributed to the underdevelopment of the Italian financial system, by stifling financial 
innovation.  
 
Given  the  previous  pattern  of  regulation  leading  to  financial  innovation,  the  obvious 
question is: why did it take so long, after the Second World War, for new unregulated financial 
instruments to develop in the Italian context? Answering this question goes beyond the limited aims 
of the present paper. A plausible hypothesis however is that post-war financial repression was made 
possible  by  three  concurring  causes:  tight  regulation,  state  ownership  of  the  main  financial 
intermediaries and limited international capital mobility. Moreover, the unprecedented high rate of   24 
growth of the real economy coupled with extraordinary macroeconomic stability hid the costs of 
“financial repression”. It was only in the 1970s with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the 
spreading of the eurodollar and the reappearance of episodes of bank failures that the soundness of 
the  1936  arrangements  began  to  be  questioned.  It  took  another  decade  for  financial 
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Appendix 1: The main banking regulatory reforms in Italy 
 
 
Year  Regulating entities  Regulated entities  Main regulatory 
instruments* 
Post-1861 (year of 
Italy’s unification) 
Commercial banks were subject to the Code of Commerce, similarly to 
industrial  firms;  there  was,  however,  a  fragmentary  plethora  of  laws 
concerning specific financial institutions. Issuing banks were regulated 
according to their statutes. 
Law N. 1920 of 30
th 
April 1874 (Minghetti 
Law) 
Ministry of Finance  The six banks of issue  Limits on competition; 
limits on note issuance; 
restrictions on activities 
and asset holdings; 
information disclosure to 
Ministry of Finance 





together with the 
Treasury Ministry 
The banks of issue 
(Bank of Italy, Banco 
di Napoli, Banco di 
Sicilia), reduced in 
number from six to 
three 
Upper limit on issuance; 
list of permissible 
activities; reserve 
requirements; regulation on 
corporate governance; on-
site examinations; 
disclosure to Parliament; 
suspension or annulment of 
issuing right in case of 
violation of law 
Royal decree N. 442 
of 12
th October 1894 
Treasury Ministry  Unvaried  Unvaried 
Law N. 804 of 31
st 
December 1907 
Unvaried  The three banks of 
issue 
Less stringent limits on 
circulation 
Royal decree N. 812 
of 6
th May 1926 
Unification of note issuance, attributed solely to the Bank of Italy 
Royal decrees N. 1511 
of 7
th September 1926 
and N. 1830 of 6
th 
November 1926  
Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of the 
National Economy and 
Bank of Italy, both in 





institutions, defined as 
aziende di credito 
(except for the two ex-
issuing banks, Banco 
di Napoli and Banco di 
Sicilia, subject to a 
specific regulation)  
Restrictions on entry and 
mergers; information 
disclosure to the Bank of 
Italy; capital and reserve 
requirements; restrictions 
on assets; fines and repeal 
of bank charters in case of 
violation of law 
Royal decrees N. 375 
of 12
th March 1936 
and N.1400 of 17
th 
July 1937  
Inspectorate 
(Ispettorato per la 
difesa del risparmio e 
per l’esercizio del 
credito), under a 
Committee of 
Ministers; head of the 
Inspectorate is the 
Governor of the Bank 
of Italy; de facto, the 
Inspectorate never 
operated separately 
from the Bank of Italy 
Two obligatory 
categories according to 
the maturity (short 
term and long term) of 
their liabilities; the 
long-term liability 
institutions had a less 
stringent regulation. 
Restrictions on entry and 
on dimensions; form of 
banks; caps on interest 
rates; capital and liability 
requirements; regulation on 
corporate governance; 
obligation for directors to 
lodge deposits to be used in 
case of losses caused to the 
institutions; disclosure to 
authorities and on-site 
examinations; some form 
of disclosure to public; 
replacement of directors 
with state officials and 
repeal of the bank charter   26 
in case of violation of the 
law 
Legislative decree N. 
691 of 17
th July 1947 
Bank of Italy (the 
Inspectorate was 
eliminated in 1944 
with a temporary 
transition of powers to 
the Treasury Ministry) 
Unvaried  Unvaried  
Law N.287 of 10
th 
October 1990 






Bank of Italy, in 
harmony with the 
European Union 
Banks, banking groups 
and financial 
intermediaries 
(defined by the law 
and which abandons 
the previous 
categorization) 
Controls on entry and on 
dimensions; regulation on 
bond issuance and on 
subordinated debt; 
regulation on bank stakes; 
capital requirements; 
regulation on corporate 
governance; information 
disclosure to Bank of Italy 
and on-site examinations ; 
information disclosure to 
the public; enforcement 
procedures 
Law N. 262 of 28th 
December 2005  
Bank of Italy, whose 
Governor’s 
appointment is limited 
to six years 
(renewable), except 
for anti-trust matters 
handed over to Anti-
trust Authority  
Unvaried  Greater transparency of 
banking contracts; 
restrictions on ownership; 
regulation on corporate 
governance; greater 
information disclosure to 
public 
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Appendix 2: A focus on the three regulatory laws (1893, 1926, 1936) 
 
The contents of the three regulatory responses to the financial crises described are here 
briefly recalled, by breaking up each law into the different crisis-prevention tools it prescribed. 
 
A. Law 10
th August 1893, n. 449: 
 
1.  Regulating entity 
The  regulatory  and  supervisory  authority  was  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Industry  and 
Commerce, together with the Treasury Ministry. 
 
2.  Perimeter of regulation 
Only the three banks of issue were regulated. The Bank of Italy, a joint stock company like 
its predecessors, was founded as the result of the merger of Banca Nazionale nel Regno d’Italia, 
Banca Nazionale Toscana and Banca Toscana di credito. It also absorbed the assets and liabilities of 
Banca Romana. The other two banks of issue, Banco di Napoli and Banco di Sicilia, continued 
operating. 
 
3. Restrictions on undertakings 
Each bank of issue was allotted an upper limit to its banknote issuance (800 million lire for 
the Bank of Italy, 242 million for Banco di Napoli and 55 million for Banco di Sicilia, for a total of 
1.097 million, about 10 per cent of 1893 GNP), which could be exceeded only if the banknotes in 
excess were backed up by an equal amount of gold/silver in the bank’s possession. The upper 
bound was not binding also in the case of ordinary and extraordinary advances to the Treasury. 
However, these advances were restricted (by a previous law of 1891) to 172 million for the three 
banks put together. 
The range of activities permitted to banks of issue was listed: discounting of bills, Treasury 
bills, warrants not earlier than 4 months from expiration; advances on government bonds and other 
safe assets
42; purchase or sale in currency of foreign drafts and cheques with an expiration date no 
later than three months. The banks of issue could also retain deposits on demand. However, if the 
deposits exceeded specified amounts, the bank involved had to reduce the circulation by three 
                                                 
42 Bonds guaranteed by the State, certificates issued by land credit institutions (istituti di credito fondiario), bonds 
payable in gold, issued or guaranteed by foreign States, gold and silver currency and gold, raw and processed silk and 
silver, certificates of credit, certificates of deposit of spirits and cognac, not earlier than six months from expiration.   28 
quarters of the exceeding amount. Any other operation was forbidden and if the banks were found 
to be engaging in forbidden activities, they were forced to pay a sanction which was three times 
the discount rate applied to the amount of the illegal pursuits.  
 
4. Price regulation 
The discount rate could not be changed without the assent of the Government and was the 
same for all banks.  
 
5. Capital and liability requirements 
The reserve in gold, silver and foreign bills was brought to a minimum of 40% of the banks’ 
paper circulation. The composition of such a reserve was also regulated (silver and foreign bills had 
to be a very minor part of the total). Other liabilities, such as promissory notes, also had to be 
counterbalanced by a 40% reserve. Any circulation in excess was taxed at twice the discount rate. 
The paid-up capital of the banks ought to be no less than 25% of paper circulation. 
 
6. Regulation on corporate governance 
The law prescribed by: a. collegiality of the executive board; b. approval of the director 
general  and  two  vices  by  the  government;  c.  prohibition  of  MPs  to  work,  even  without 
remuneration, in the banks of issue.  
 
7. Disclosure to authorities and on-site examinations 
Every  two  years  an  on-site  examination  had  to  be  organized  by  the  two  supervisory 
authorities,  after  which  the  subsequent  reports  had  to  be  presented  in  Parliament  within  three 
months from the inspection.  
 
8. Enforcement of the regulation 
Enforcement of the regulation was induced by the fact that any bank of issue which did not 
conform to the banking law or to its statute would see the suspension or annulment of its issuing 
right. Any employee of the bank who deliberately deceived the inspectors could be punished with 




B. Royal decrees 7
th September 1926, n. 1511 and 6
th November 1926, n. 1830: 
 
1.  Regulating entity   29 
The regulators were the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the National Economy and the 
Bank of Italy, the last two of which were in a subordinated position. Specific categories of banks 
were under the direct supervision of the Ministry of the National Economy. 
 
2.  Perimeter of regulation 
This included all banks and credit institutions which collected deposits, defined as Aziende 
di credito. Exempt from regulation were industrial and commercial firms which retained deposits, 
as a secondary activity, of their directors or employees. The 1926 law also referred to savings 
banks, Monti di Pietà and rural credit institutions. 
 
3.  Restrictions on entry and dimensions 
The institutions could not start up their activity nor open up offices or branches without the 
two previously mentioned Ministries’ authorization, once the bank of issue has been heard. Mergers 
too had to be authorized by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
4.  Restrictions on asset holdings 
Loans extended by a bank to the same borrower could not exceed one fifth of the bank’s 
equity. Derogations from the law could be authorized. 
 
5.  Capital and liability requirements 
Minimum start-up capital requirements were stated; they varied according to the type of 
credit institutions. The regulated entities had to use at least one tenth of annual profits to build up an 
ordinary  reserve,  until  this  became  40%  of  capital.  Total  equity  could  not  be  lower  than  one 
twentieth of the deposits collected. Any excess deposits had to be invested in government bonds or 
be deposited at the Bank of Italy.  
 
6.  Disclosure to authorities and on-site examinations 
Annual balance sheets were to be sent to the Bank of Italy, as well as two-monthly financial 
situations. Occasionally on-site inspections were organised and banks were asked to present all 
documents requested 
 
7.  Enforcement of the regulation 
In case of violation of the norms, pecuniary sanctions were applied. In the case of severe 
violations, bank charters could be revoked.   30 
 
C. Royal decrees of 12
th March 1936,  n. 375  and 17
th July 1937, n.1400 : 
 
1.  Regulating entity 
The Ispettorato per la difesa del risparmio e per l’esercizio del credito was created as the 
regulatory  and  supervisory  authority.  The  Inspectorate  was  subordinated  to  a  Committee  of 
Ministers, led by the Prime Minister (and since 1947 by the Minister of Treasury). The Prime 
Minister could also adopt urgent measures by decree. Head of the Inspectorate was the Governor of 
the Bank of Italy. The problem of the Bank of Italy’s ownership was also sorted: shareholders of the 
bank of issue could only be savings banks, public institutions and banks of national interest
43, social 
security institutions and insurance companies and it was hence defined a public institution (Istituto 




2.  Perimeter of regulation 
The new perimeter of regulation included two broad categories of institutions, distinguished 
according to the maturity of their liabilities. The short-term liability institutions included: a) public 
institutions  (istituti  di  credito  di  diritto  pubblico)
45  and  banks  of  national  interest  (banche  di 
interesse nazionale), that is joint-stock companies of national tenure, recognized as such by royal 
decree, with branches in at least 30 Italian provinces
46; b) banks and institutions which held demand 
or short-term deposits; c) branches in Italy of foreign banks; d) savings banks (Casse di risparmio) 
and  e)  other  minor  banks.
47    A  different,  and  less  stringent  regulation,  was  designed  for  the 
institutions  which  collected  medium  or  long-term  funds,
48  thus  creating  a  dichotomy  in  bank 
regulation. With respect to the second category of institutions, the 1936 law mainly referred to the 
specific legislation previously introduced for each type.
49  
 
3.  Restrictions on entry and dimensions 
                                                 
43 Banks of national interest are defined in point 2. 
44 Until 16th March 1939, the Bank of Italy could still exceptionally be authorized to discount private agents’ notes in 
order to satisfy urgent and exceptional needs of certain sectors of production. 
45 These were: Banco di Napoli, Banco di Sicilia, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro and Istituto di San Paolo a Torino, plus 
the newly created Monte dei Paschi di Siena. 
46 These were defined in the first decree as banche di diritto pubblico, causing great lexical confusion with the former 
banks, and included the three ex-universal banks. 
47 These included State pawnshops (Monti di credito su pegno) and rural and artisan banks (Casse rurali e artigianali). 
48 The definition of short, medium and long-term was left to the credit authorities. Only in a deliberation of 28th 
January 1963, the CICR stated that short-term meant less than 18 months, medium-term was between 18 and 60 months 
and long-term greater than 60 months. 
49 Land credit, building credit, agricultural credit, naval credit, Imi, Icipu, Crediop, etc.   31 
Controls on entry and restrictions on branching and mergers by the regulatory authority, 
introduced  by  the  previous  legislation,  were  confirmed.  All  possible  types  of  branches  were 
enumerated, in order to subject them all to authorization. The Inspectorate could also order the 
closure of banks and branches. 
 
4.  Regulation on ownership and control 
The form of the private regulated entities had to be that of public limited companies (società 
per azioni) or limited partnerships with share capital (società in accomandita per azioni). Their 
shares had to be registered. The issue of bank ownership was not explicitly treated in the 1936 
legislation.  
 
5. Restrictions on undertakings and asset holdings 
Certain types of assets (e.g. long-term credits, industrial stakes) required the Inspectorate’s 
authorization to be purchased. The regulatory authority also decided on the proportions of different 
investments  that  intermediaries  could  undertake,  considering  liquidity  issues  and  the  different 
branches  of  economic  activity  the  investments  referred  to.  Finally,  the  Inspectorate  could  also 
decide upon the procedures to eliminate or reduce any residual long-term investment in the short-
term liability banks’ portfolios.  
The Inspectorate could also dictate instructions on the prudential measures to be undertaken 
to avoid excessive risk-taking due to an accumulation of fidi, on the maximum limit of allowable 
fidi
50, on the procedures to reduce any excess, on the information borrowers had to reveal to be able 
to demand credit.  
 
6. Price regulation 
Regulated  entities  had  to  comply  to  instructions  on  interest  rates both  on  loans  and  on 
deposits and on the costs of other banking services, dictated by the Inspectorate.  
 
7. Capital and liability requirements 
The  Inspectorate  decided  on  the  minimum  amount  of  capital  necessary  to  open  a  new 
financial  institution,  the  minimum  percentage  of  profits  to  be  allocated  to  reserves,  the  ratio 
between equity and liabilities.  
 
8.  Regulation on compensations and insurance schemes 
                                                 
50 The fixed proportion of one fifth introduced by the 1926 law was, thus, abandoned.   32 
The 1936 legislation did not regulate directors’ remunerations. Instead, insurance schemes 
were contemplated. Directors of the banks and of their branches had to contribute up to 3% of their 
compensations  to  a  special  deposit  which  could  be  liquidated  only  after  one  year  from  the 
termination of the directors’ working contract. This deposit could be employed by the bank in case 
of losses incurred, due to activities undertaken which exceeded their assignments. This provision 
was later abolished (Associazione Bancaria Italiana 1972: 325). 
 
9.  Regulation on corporate governance 
State officials were forbidden to work for the regulated entities. On the other hand, banks’ 
directors could not cover similar roles in other firms, if not otherwise authorized. Directors and 
auditors  could  not  freely  contract  obligations  nor  sign  purchase  or  sale  contracts  with  the 
intermediaries they managed or oversaw. The Inspectorate could also order the convocation of 
shareholders’ and of Board of Directors’ meetings or convene the meetings directly if the competent 
authorities did not act promptly.  
With  respect  to  the  afore-mentioned  fidi,  financial  institutions  had  to  keep  a  book  of 
credits, in which all the authorized lines of credit were to be written down. The names of the 
officials that had offered the lines of credit were also registered. Incentives to avoid excessive risk-
taking by banks were also accompanied by norms aimed at attaining correct information disclosure 
by the borrowers, also concerning fidi obtained by other banks. In fact, any erroneous or misleading 
information given was to be punished with a fine or by imprisonment.
51   
 
10. Disclosure to authorities and on-site examinations 
The  regulated  entities  had  to  periodically  transmit  their  balance  sheets  and  any  other 
information required to the Inspectorate. The contents and the form of the balance sheets were 
decided by the Inspectorate, as was their means of publication. Furthermore, the minutes of the 
shareholders’  meetings  had  to  be  submitted  to  the  Inspectorate,  together  with  any  proposals, 
assessments or objections made by the auditors.  
Periodic and unannounced on-site examinations were also undertaken by officials who 
could ask for any type of document or act deemed useful.  
 
11. Disclosure to the public 
                                                 
51 In 1962 the Bank of Italy created the Centrale dei rischi bancari, a centralized centre of risk monitoring, following 
the example of other countries, to better oversee the concession of lines of credit.   33 
As well as disclosure to the authorities, some form of disclosure to the public was also 
required. In all forms of communication and publicity, in fact, the intermediaries had to list the 
capital and reserves held, according to the latest balance sheet.  
 
12. Enforcement of the regulation 
To enforce the regulation, the Inspectorate could turn to the Prime Minister, who could break up the 
Board of Directors in the case of serious irregularities or violations of the law. Situations of extreme 
urgency could lead to bank directors being replaced by an official of the Inspectorate, but for no 
more than 2 months. The liquidation procedures were also regulated. Finally, in the case of extreme 




































   34 
Appendix 3: Institutions involved in crisis management and resolution in Italy 
 
Prudential regulation is a tool used for crisis prevention, in order to make the financial 
system robust to crises. However, in the case of the actual occurrence of a financial crisis, crisis 
management and resolution becomes the relevant issue. In this appendix, we have recalled the ad 
hoc institutions that were founded in Italy in the period under analysis in order to resolve financial 
crises. 
 
Consorzio per Sovvenzioni su Valori Industriali. Founded in 1914, it became active in 
1915, just before Italy’s entrance in the First World War. It was designed as a temporary institution 
in order to avoid fire sales of troubled industrial firms’ assets. The Consorzio, in fact, extended 
credit  to  the  industrial  sector,  accepting  the  firms’  shares  as  collateral,  an  activity  which  was 
forbidden by law to the Bank of Italy. The Consorzio was financed by the banks of issue and the 
Bank of Italy guided its management. The Consorzio’s “Special Section” was created in 1922 to 
guarantee a safety net for banks: it aided the liquidation of the Banca Italiana di Sconto and it was 
used to rescue the Banco di Roma.  
 
Istituto  di  Liquidazioni.  It  was  created  in  November  1926  to  wind  down  the  Special 
Section’s undertakings, when the latter was closed down. In particular, it was to sell the previous 
institution’s assets on the market, in order to deflate the economy, in view of the return to the gold 
standard. However, due to the outbreak of the new crisis starting in 1930, it was involved in new 
rescue operations. The Istituto was financed, in part, by the Bank of Italy, in part by the State and 
was guided by a committee nominated by the Ministry of Finance.  
 
Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI). It was created with the legislative decree 
23
rd January 1933, n. 5, as a temporary institution to rescue the banks and firms by them controlled. 
It then became a State-owned holding company. In particular, it was made up of two sections: 
Sezione  smobilizzi,  which  substituted  the  previous  Istituto  delle  Liquidazioni,  and  Sezione 
finanziamenti for the financing of the industrial sector, with up to 20-year loans, since the universal 
banks  had  been  abolished.  The  latter  section  was  soon  closed  down  and  its  functions  were 
transferred to Istituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI), an institution created in 1931, which made medium-
term (maximum ten-year) loans to industrial firms, and financed itself by issuing securities, not 
being allowed to collect deposits. The Sezione Smobilizzi acquired all the industrial stakes in the 
universal banks’ portfolio and the banks themselves. Its funding was not provided via the issuance   35 
of money by the Bank of Italy, but it was financed by the market and by the State. In 1933 IRI 
controlled
52: 
-  100% of  the iron and steel war industry, of the artillery industry and of the coal-
extraction industry 
-  90% of the naval industry 
-  80% of naval companies and of  the locomotive industry 
-  40% of the iron and steel industry 
-  30% of the electricity industry 
-  20% of the rayon industry 
-  13% of the cotton industry 
It also controlled the mechanical and armaments’ industries, telephone services and the 
three biggest banks. In all, IRI owned over 40% of the Italian shareholders’ capital, hence resulting 
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